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THE ADMISSIBILITY OF PAROL EVIDENCE TO
ESTABLISH -BOUNDARIES'
Reportedly" in Virginia it is a common practice to execute
deeds of conveyance in which land is described as being, bounded
by the land of adjoining landowners. In a hypothetical case where
A's land is described in the deed as bounded by B's land on the
north, C's land on the west, D's land on the south and E's land on
the east, the question may arise as to whether parol evidence, in
the absence of a claim by adverse possession, would be admissible
to establish these boundaries once they are attacked by a purchaser
under a subsequent deed describing part of this same land by metes
and bounds.
While there has been no case decided in Virginia to support
either the admission or the exclusion of the evidence," the dictum
in the case of Bradshaw v. Booth' states: "The extent of boundaries
of land, and thus the title to land, cannot be established wholly by
parol' evidence, unsupported by written evidence of title, where
title by adverse possession is not involved and where the case is
one in which the title claimed is by deed and must have been
derived by deed, if derived at all; for to hold otherwise would be
1.

Virginia Code of 1950. Title 8, Article 3, Establishment of Boundaries:
§8-836 "Any person having a subsisting interest in real estate and a right to its
possession of some share, interest or portion thereof, upon petition filed in the court
which would have jurisdiction in an action of ejectment concerning such real estate,
or at rules in the clerk's office thereof, shall have the right to have ascertained and
designated by such court the true boundary line or lines to such real estate as to one
or more of the coterminous landowners. Petitioner in stating his interest shall conform to
the requirements of §8-804. [i.e., state the interest he claims], and shall describe with
reasonable certainty such real estate and the boundary line or lines thereof which he
seeks to establish. A plat. showing such real estate and boundary line or lines, filed
with the petition, may serve the purposes of such description.
§8-837
The petitioner shall make defendants to such petition all persons having
a present interest in the boundary line or lines sought to be ascertained and designated, and the case shall be commenced by serving a copy of the petition upon the
defendant or by giving him notice in writing that such petition has been filed. No
formal plea or answer to such petition shall be necessary, but the defendant shall
state his grounds of defense in writing, if any he has, and the parties shall be
deemed to be at issue, which issue shall be the true boundary line or lines of such
real estate.
§8-838 "The trial shall be conducted as other trials at law, and the same ruer of
evidence shall apply and the same defenses may be made as in other actions at law.
A trial by jury may be waived by consent of the parties, and the case be tried by the
court. Counsel for the petitioner shall have the right to open and conclude the
argument. The judge of the court in term time or vacation may direct such surveys
to be made as he may deem necessary [Italics added].
§8-839 "In a proceeding under this article, no claim of the plaintiff for rents,
f rofcts or damages shall be considered.
8-840 "The judgment of the court shall be recorded in the common law order
book, and in the current deed book of the court, and indexed in the names of the
parties. The judgment unless reversed shall forever settle, determine, and designate
the true boundary line or lines in question, and be binding upon the parties, their
heirs, devisees , and assigns. The judgment may be enforced in the same manner as a
judgment in an action of ejectment.
§8-841 "A writ of error
the Supreme Court of Appeals shall lie to such
judgment in like manner as from
in a common law action."
2. Letter to D. W. Woodbridge from Ernest Goodrich, November 19, 1953.
3. Cf. Hamman v. Miller, 116 Va. 873. 83 S.E. 382 (1914).
4. 129 Va. 19, 105 S.E. 555 (1921).

to permit parol evidence to become an indeperdent source of title,
which by the weight of autbority, and certainly in Virginia, is not
permissible."' The court also said, "But such declaration ...

to be

admissable in evidence must have reference to monuments or other
delineation on the ground of the extent of the boundaries designated
in some evidence of title." This has been interpreted by a lower
court in Virginia to mean that without a reference in the deed itself
to a particular call, line or monument on the ground to which parol
evidence could attach itself, parol evidence is inadmissible to establish the true boundary. If this rule were to be applied to the hypothetical case in question, an obvious injustice would result, for
a purchaser, by virtue of a subsequent deed to land encroaching
upon A's property but described by metes and bounds, would have
the superior title, even thdugh A, claiming under his prior deed,
has occupied and cultivated his land and only wishes by parol evidence to prove the extent of his land as described in the deed.
The propriety of applying such a construction of the dictum
of Bradshaw v. Booth to the facts of the present hypothetical situation is seriously questioned, for in that case the issue raised was
not the admissibility of the evidence but whether it was error merely to instruct the jury that the boundary should be determined from
all the evidence and to refuse an instruction that the plaintiff had
the burden of showing complete legal title. In holding it to be erroneous, because it left the jury without any standard fixing the
sufficiency of evidence of title, the court expressly noted the fact
that with respect to that part of the boundary of which there was
no mention made in the deed no evidence was admitted even tending to show that the plaintiff was entitled to it. In the light of the
injustice which would result from the application of such an interpretation, it is contended here that the court could not have intended that construction to govern.
A broader and more reasonable interpretation of the court's
requirement that declarations must have reference to monuments
or other delineation on the ground showing the extent of boundaries designated in some evidence of title would be to permit parol
evidence to show a monument on the ground, which, though not
mentioned in the deed, was nevertheless intended to be determinative of a boundary which was referred to in the deed. Courts of
5.
6.

Id. at 38. 105 S.E. 555. 561.
Ibid.

other jurisdictions have held this to be the law. In North Carolina
the court when presented with a deed reading, "50 acres of land
lying in the county of H. and bounded as follows: by the land of
L., L., and S.," held that, since there was nothing in the descriptive clause from which the particular 50 acres of the land mentioned
in the deed could be identified, parol evidence was admissible to
aid the description.' Also, in Massachusetts, where a deed described
land as bounded by lands of the grantor on the east and west, the
court held that oral evidence was admissible to show that bounds
or monuments existed at the date of the deed which were agreed
orally by the parties as showing the true lines."
If the Virginia courts should be found unwilling to apply the
broader interpretation, there is authority to support the argument
that adjoining land on which the boundary line in question is said
to abut may be regarded as a monument." In the case of Smith v.
Bailey,' where the entire land in the deed was described in relation
to the property of H. H. Lavenstein, the court in noting that fact
said, "It [Lavenstein line] is both the alpha and the omega of the
description, and it was the duty of the court, as it would be of a
surveyor, to locate this line and lot, since it was a monument, a
call, in the true location of the lot conveyed.'"' The court quoted
with approval from a West Virginia case," in which it was said,
".... a tract of land called for as a monument, in the description of

another tract, is to be located in accordance with the true interpretation of its boundaries as of the time at which its description
was written, the date of the deed . . ."'

Treating the reference to adjoining land as a reference to a
monument renders applicable the universal rule that evidence
aliunde is always admissible where there is a question as to the application of a grant to its proper subject matter and where the problem is one of location.' Distinction is made by the courts of Virginia
between construction, which is the determination of the real meaning or explanation of obscure or ambiguous terms of a written
instrument or oral agreement by calling in the aid of extrinsic evidence, and location, which is the designation of boundaries of a
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Blow v. Vaughan, 105 N.C. 198, 10 S.E. 891 (1890).
Hooten v. Comerford. 152 Mass. 591. 26 N.E. 407 (1891).
4 Tiffany. Red Propasy 5993 (3rd ed. 1939).
141 Va. 757. 127 S.8.89 (1925).
Id.at 770. 127 S.8.89. 93.
State
v. Herold, 76 W.Va. 537, 85 S.E. 733 (1915).
76 W.Va. 537, -.
85 S.E. 733. 735.
New River Mineral Co. v. Painter, 100 Va. 507, 42 S.E. 300 (1902).

particular piece of land either upon the record or on the land itself
by extrinsic evidene." When the true location of the land in dispute has been ascertained, parol evidence is admissible to show the
proper location of all the descriptive locations and calls in the deed,
to the end of determining whether or not the land in dispute passed
by it and thus give effect to the true intent of the parties.'
The deed in the hypothetical case now under consideration will
provide the required written evidence of title if the description
meets the tests of certainty; for, if the property is not described
with sufficient accuracy to identify it, then it is deemed void for
vagueness and indefiniteness, although even in the absence of a precise description the courts are loath to declare a deed invalid." Two
general rules applied in construing writings are, "(1), That they
shall, if possible, be so interpreted ut res majis valeat quam pereat,
so that they shall have some effect rather than none; and (2), That
such a meaning shall be given to them as may carry out and most
fully effectuate the intention of the parties . . ."' Under these two
rules, the test for certainty in the description of a deed requires
language sufficient to serve as a pointer or a guide to the ascertainment of the location of the land.'
The expression of the intention of the parties must appear on
the deed, and it is the purpose of parol evidence to explain this
intention but never to create it.' The description must at least
furnish the means of identification; and, where the means are thus
present, parol or extrinsic evidence may be admitted as an aid to
identify the land definitely.'

The deed in the hypothetical case clearly manifests the intention of the parties that the adjoining land determine the boundary of the lot in question and thereby furnish the means of identification. Thus the description is sufficiently certain to render the
deed valid. Since valid written evidence of title is available to support the introduction of parol evidence, it is submitted that the
admissibility of parol evidence would not serve as an independent
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Reusens v. Lawson. 91 Vs. 226. 21 &. 347 (1895).
Baker v. Seekright. 1 Hen. & Mon. (11 V'-) 177 (1806); Pasley v. Enl.sh.
.Gri. .(46 Vs.)141 (1848); Elliott v. Hoon. 28 Grat. (69 Vs.) 7
877):
Hunter v. Hume. 88 Va. 24. 13 S.EL 305 (1891). Se 9W more.
,.
187-192 C3rd ed. 1940).
2 Minor, Rea Pro,,pey §1072 (2d ed. Ribble. 1928).
2 Minor. Isaistaw, p. 948 (2d ed. 1877).
Vanover v. Ho
d. 145 V. 749, 134 S.A. 548 (1926).
Ibid.
2 Minor. Red Propry §1072 (2d ed. Ribble. 1928).

source of title but would show only the extent of A's title. The full
import and necessity of applying this broad rule of' evidence' to a
deed of this nature is realized when contrasted with the gravity of
the consequences which would follow the application of the narrower rule. Since much of the land in Virginia is described in this
general manner and most of the land is uncultivated, thereby increasing the difficulty, of claiming title by adverse possession, the
adoption of the narrower interpretation would undermine titles to
extensive areas throughout the state.
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